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Non-union forms of employee representation have become increasingly prominent in
UK workplaces in the last 15 years. In addition, partnership working has been
encouraged by New Labour, the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development,
the Confederation of British Industry and the TUC as a route to higher commitment
and higher individual and organisational performance. These trends have been
further encouraged by recent European Union legislation. This article seeks to
examine the implied linkages between non-union employee representative
mechanisms and partnership working and their influence on the effectiveness of
employee voice as a conduit of high performance. The article is based on a case study
organisation from within the UK finance sector, and data are drawn from semi-
structured interviews with managers and staff and a survey of employee attitudes.
The article concludes that employers’ attempts to utilise a non-union partnership
framework for organisational gain are severely constrained by structural limitations
on effective employee voice.
Contact: Professor Martin Upchurch, Middlesex University Business School,
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The 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) recorded a growth ofnon-union forms of joint consultation between employers and employeerepresentatives in recent years, together with a more pronounced growth of
direct forms of employee participation. WERS records that the proportion of
workplaces with union-only ‘voice’ fell from 24 to 9 per cent between 1984 and 1998,
those with a mixture of union and non-union voice fell from 42 to 33 per cent, those
with a non-union only voice increased from 16 to 40 per cent and those with no voice
remained steady, increasing from 16 to 17 per cent (Millward et al., 2000: 122,
table 4.13).1 Initial figures from WERS2004 suggest that 5 per cent of workplaces
contain ‘stand-alone non-union forms of employee representation’ either alongside
unions or, more likely, in workplaces where there is no union presence (Kersley et al.,
2005). When presented as a whole, these figures would suggest that UK industrial
relations had moved over the last two decades from a predominantly traditional,
union-based system of representation to a multi-channel system of representation that
includes a substantial section of non-union representation (Gospel and Willman, 2003;
Ackers et al., 2005). This emerging picture of multi-channel representation raises
crucial concerns and questions. First, there is clearly a ‘representation gap’ among UK
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workers, especially in the private sector. This may be worrying not only for trade
unions but also for proponents of the thesis that an effective employee voice aids
organisational efficiency and productivity. This latter contention is shared by the UK
government, which has promoted models of the ‘High-Performance Workplace’ based
on effective employee voice and partnership working (Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI), 2002). The Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations,
implemented in the UK in April 2005, reinforces this approach and contextualises the
move towards a more supportive institutional environment for employee
representation, including notions of enhanced economic and industrial ‘citizenship’
(Kristensen, 2001; Martin, 2003). However, UK government statements on both
partnership and employee voice as well as on reports from other interested agencies
such as the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD, 2001) fall
conspicuously short of translating the desire for employee representation into trade
union representation and collective bargaining. What is proposed instead is a range of
employee representation models, including both union and non-union representations
as well as forms of direct representation associated with soft HRM techniques. The
omission of the social aspects of partnership in terms of an institutional framework
supportive of unions is a confirmation of the UK’s commitment to modified neo-liberal
economic agendas, as evidenced by the government’s hostility to the European
Union’s (EU) Charter for Fundamental Rights (Watt and Black, 2004). It may also
reflect the different tradition of UK industrial relations when compared with the core
countries central to the European Social Model (Hyman, 2005).
This commitment of government and employers to the multi-channel model poses
important questions that need testing by case study evidence. There has been an
emerging body of literature examining non-union workplaces, usually from within
perspectives that focus on particular aspects of managerial strategy (see Dundon and
Rollinson, 2004 for a review). Most studies have presented models describing
strategies for union avoidance and the maintenance of managerial authority (Roy,
1980; Guest and Hoque, 1994; McLoughlin and Gourlay, 1994) while others have
focused on product markets as contextual driving factors (Rubery 1988; Kochan et al.,
1986). However, given the new institutional environment, it is now of increasing
interest to examine the voice effectiveness of non-union forms of employee representation
(NER) rather than that of non-unionism per se, particularly in cases where there is
an expressed management preference for a partnership route to organisational
effectiveness and efficiency. As Gollan (2005) notes, debates in this field of inquiry
focus on the ability of NER to match or exceed the effectiveness of trade unions as
conduits of employee voice and interest. Is it the case that employees might work
successfully within consultative-based mechanisms to further their interest (Bryson,
2000), or is NER a cosmetic process of employee representation that is likely to be
dominated by management sympathisers (Kelly, 1996; Terry, 1999, 2003; Wills, 2000)?
In this article, we explore such a case study from the UK finance sector where a
Partners’ Council (PC) has been established on a non-union basis. We ask two major
questions. The first focuses on management motives and objectives in creating and
supporting such an employee relations structure. Second, we explore the
effectiveness of the particular structure for expressing employee voice. We also
make some comments on the implications of changing UK legislation for this and
similar non-union forms of employee representation. Our research included over
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40 interviews of employees at FinanceCo during 2003, ranging from managers,
specialists and administrative/secretarial staff and 128 email-based survey returns
from a sample of 400 employees across all occupations. The selected sample reflects
the occupational and divisional spread of staff in the organisation. FinanceCo is a
UK-based building society that recently became part of a British Isles-based banking
and financial services group. The building society has never recognised trade unions,
and historically, any collective employee voice was channelled through a dependent
staff association. In recent years, FinanceCo established a PC of non-union employee
representatives, which was then revamped and consolidated after a failed attempt
was made by the banking and finance union (UNIFI) to establish a union recognition
agreement. The research is part of a wider examination of case studies into the
‘Patterns and Prospects for Partnership at Work in the UK’ funded by the Economic
and Social Research Courcil (ESRC) Future of Work Programme.2
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE FINANCE SECTOR
Finance and related businesses in the UK now represent about 19 per cent of all UK
employment3 and have had a long tradition of non-union staff representation or
representation by dependent staff associations. This is in addition to sections of trade
union representation. Within the sector as a whole (financial intermediation), the
2003 Labour Force Survey recorded union density at 25.9 per cent, with 51 per cent
of all employees working in a workplace where trade union members are present.4
Industrial relations practices have historically been extremely diverse. In the past,
divisions between the three sub-sectors (banking, insurance and building societies)
in the UK were fairly well established, but since the 1980s, boundaries within the
sector have become blurred as they have undergone the ‘financial services
revolution’ (Moran, 1991). The sector has been especially affected by mergers,
acquisitions and takeovers alongside deregulation and then re-regulation of financial
markets and demutualisation within the sector. This process has been a response to
increased competition as organisations seek to develop economies of scale and secure
an increased market share (Hasluck, 1999).
Challenges to the staff association dominance began to emerge in the 1970s,
especially in retail banks whereby the Bank, Insurance and Finance Union (BIFU)
absorbed some of the staff associations. The independent unions representing the
sector (predominantly Amicus – through its old Manufacturing, Science and Finance
Union (MSF) section – and UNIFI) have traditionally recorded low levels of
militancy. This has been explained in the past, with a particular reference to banking
as a reflection of the conservative organisational culture of the industry, setting banks
apart from the ‘more vulgar occupations of industry and commerce’ (Nevin and
Davis, 1979). In the 1990s, Gall (1999) recorded a change in bank workers’ attitudes
towards a more collective and pro-union orientation driven by work intensification
and regimentation, which may be a precursor of similar developments in the rest of
the finance sector. Employer strategy, in response, includes the development of
partnership arrangements, with 14 signed in the sector between 1997 and 2000 (Gall,
2000).
Alongside capital, concentration and restructuring major changes to the
organisation of work have taken place as employers have sought to become
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cost-efficient in a competitive product market (Danford et al., 2003: 97–121). De/re-
regulation and demutualisation are reasons for the emergence of a new management
‘model’ whereby the old model based on paternalism, conservatism and bureaucracy
has given way to a model of sales and performance orientation and technocracy
(Cressey and Scott, 1992). Evidence from the banking sector (Storey et al., 1997) and
from insurance (Danford et al., 2003: 97–121) suggests that this new model has not
always been successfully translated into the creation and consolidation of softer
HRM techniques based on employee involvement and participation. This is partly
because of a continuation of the old management culture and partly because of staff
reductions and low trust of management motives fed by job insecurity. Delayering
of management jobs has been accompanied with the break up of the whole business
into separately accountable business divisions. New forms of pay are prevalent in the
sector, based on individual performance and sometimes linked with job evaluation
to accommodate shifting skills in relation to new technology.
FINANCECO’S EMPLOYEE RELATIONS STRATEGY
No trade unions have ever been recognised at FinanceCo, but a Staff Association had
been in existence prior to the establishment of PC. FinanceCo both before and after
the takeover had restructured itself on the basis of business divisions, each with their
own budget and targets, which were linked to a profit-sharing scheme (Sharing in
Success). The PC was established in 1992 and then revamped in 2001. From this date,
it comprised elected employee representatives from different sections with a full-time
chair of the PC seconded to the post. All staff members are automatically members
of the PC. In constructing the PC, the company decided to conduct a ballot asking
the staff on the type of representation they would prefer, including the option of
trade union recognition. The chair of the PC explains:
. . . there was a Staff Association, but what point there was, nobody
could really see because it made absolutely no difference to the decision-
making process at all. So they had a staff survey asking how would you
like to be represented, would you like us to recognise a union, are you
happy with what you’ve got, or would you like what you’ve got but
with a bit more teeth? And that’s what the majority of staff voted for. . . .
Since then, the PC has continued to operate in the building society section of the
overall banking group, with a central PC supplemented by smaller PCs based in each
business division. Following an attempt by UNIFI to recruit members and to seek a
recognition agreement at the organisation in 2001, the PC was consolidated, and new
efforts were made by the HR Department to strengthen representation. Within the
framework of Marchington’s (1994) ‘models of employee consultation’, the PC would
thus fall within the non-union model category designed by management with the
primary intention of keeping out a union presence and of acting as a ‘safety valve’
for employee opinion. One member of senior management admitted this in stark
terms when asked the reason for the PC: ‘Being fairly cynical I would say it is fear
of trade unions, would be my first reaction’. The PC was enhanced to give staff
members a greater say ‘in influencing important issues such as HR policies, business
changes, fairness in reward and staff satisfaction’ (Internal FinanceCo document).
Employee representation and partnership in non-union sector
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Other reasons for this strengthening of employee representation are twofold. First,
the improvement was necessary to comply with existing legal obligations to consult
with employees, especially in the light of the incoming Information and Consultation
Regulations. Second, while UNIFI had dropped its campaign to seek recognition, the
threat of union incursion remained. In the rest of the Bank Group, including its own
UK operations outside FinanceCo, unions are recognised. Senior managers at
FinanceCo have been faced with the strategic decision of whether or not to ‘fall in line’
with the rest of the Group and concede union involvement, or to continue to
pursue the non-union PC approach. To date, senior management have chosen the
latter course. This may reflect a degree of employee relations ‘path dependency’
whereby any option to change from non-union to union environment would involve
considerable transaction costs (Willman et al., 2003). However, as Willman et al. (2003:
6) also suggest, the contextual algebra of employer opposition to unionism, potential
union incursion and employee desire for voice makes such employee relations’
regime potentially unstable. Too little independence for the PC may re-invoke union
insurgence; too much may create the conditions for the absorption of the PC by
union merger.
One senior manager, for example, recognised the competing pressures:
We have one full-time representative now who runs the Partners’
Council who is paid, but one for an organisation of however many
thousand people. Is that really a serious commitment? I think there’s a
lot more we could do to make that a far more effective way otherwise
if culturally we’ve said we don’t want to be unionised, we are in fact just
really keeping the door open for a hostile unionisation to happen
because if people aren’t satisfied with the representation they’re getting,
they will eventually go and seek it somewhere else.
In terms of process, the PC also clearly plays the role of the transmission belt
of management decisions and thinking, reinforcing the ‘non-union’ aspects of
Marchington’s (1994) model. The dilemmas involved in managing such a process
were recognised by managers, one of whom referred to the PC as both ‘immature’
and ‘paternalistic’ in its form and content while criticising senior management for
not having ‘an awareness of how beneficial it (the PC) can be to create a positive
environment’. The immaturity was caused by the relative lack of awareness and
training of the intricacies of the employment relationship of the PC representatives,
while the authoritarian paternalism is built into the structure of the PC itself. This
is evidenced by the method of election of the PC chair, who was selected by the
senior HR Director as one of two official candidates for election from a wider field
of employee nominees previously vetted by the HR Department. The chair was then
given a responsibility payment for an indeterminable period of tenure as well as an
office next door to the HR director. The dependent nature of the PC is further
evidenced by the lack of formal joint codification of decisions. Although all meetings
are chaired by an elected chairperson, minutes are recorded by the personal assistant
to a senior manager (often the director of finance) without recourse to amendment
by the PC representatives. Crucially, there are no negotiations over pay, which
instead is determined centrally and unilaterally by the HR. This sense of
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powerlessness is best summarised by a PC representative commenting on the
internal workings of the PC:
I don’t actually think we carry as much weight as we’d like,
really. . . . There’ve been instances where we’ve been consulted about a
particular policy that’s going to be changed, put forward all of our
feedback and then next month the policy has actually been finalised
without us actually having been consulted . . . the minutes that we have
taken each meeting are prepared and typed up by senior management
who are distinct from Partners’ Council, so when it gets actually written
up the essence of what was talked about isn’t relayed.
Commentators on non-union representation have drawn attention to the ability to
negotiate and bargain as a real test of employee representativeness (Terry, 1999, 2003;
Gollan, 2000; Lloyd, 2001). At FinanceCo, the opportunity to negotiate was limited
with most meetings centred on management presentations of key business decisions
followed by a discussion of the implications of these decisions. This was true of
distributive issues such as pay where management prerogative was upheld by
delivering results of the pay round on an informative rather than a consultative
basis. This is not to say that there was no disagreement over the substantive issues
but rather that there was little scope within the structure for review or for the
overturning of management imperative.
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMPLOYEE VOICE
Employee voice can be measured by the mechanisms for expressing voice (both
directly and indirectly) while the effectiveness of voice can be measured by a
qualitative analysis of processes and a quantitative analysis of outcomes. Debates on
employee voice have focused on the work of Freeman and Medoff (1984) and in
particular on whether or not non-union forms of representation can be effective as
a union representation in expressing voice. Freeman and Medoff (1984) argued that
employee representation must be both collective and independent if it is to be
effective and that trade union representation is the best alternative. However, in
analysing the WERS1998 data, Bryson (2000) has suggested that the degree of
representativeness and direct (individual) voice may be more important in producing
effectiveness.
In order to disassemble these variables, we use employee involvement (EI) as a
proxy for ‘voice’ (see Table 1) because it is a concrete expression and because
employees’ perception of the effectiveness of the EI mechanisms will determine their
perception of voice effectiveness. We define effective voice as the employees’ ‘power
to persuade’ management in a particular or general course of action (Greenfield and
Pleasure, 1993: 193). We can identify the degree to which management takes
seriously (or not) this particular form of NER as a conduit of representation and
hence confirm or deny their employee relations objectives. Proponents of the
partnership approach argue that employees and their representatives should have a
greater involvement in organisational decision making as a way of establishing trust
and commitment. Decision making should be transparent in that management
should share information about the business at an early stage and conduct a
Employee representation and partnership in non-union sector
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meaningful consultation with their employees and their representatives (see Dietz
et al., 2005). However, there is a potential ‘paradox of intention’ apparent with regard
to partnership in an NER context. If management wishes to use NER as a vehicle
to suppress unions, then does this mean that the claimed benefits of partnership
are unlikely to materialise simply because an effective representative voice is
suppressed? As Hyman (2005: 259) puts it in his critique of Hirschman (1970), ‘There
is a familiar and chilling phrase: “I hear what you say”. The corollary is: “I will take
absolutely no notice”. The issue is whether, and how, voice achieves a regulatory
impact’.
First, it is clear from the survey results that there was a high awareness of the PC
and of the PC representatives. All of our respondents had heard of the PC, and 97 per
cent knew who their representative was. In addition, 82 per cent agreed that their PC
representatives put forward employees’ views. However, there was a drop in
positive responses when asked the question of whether or not the PC was effective
in representing employees’ views, with a slight majority of 56 per cent agreeing. This
discrepancy between the ability to represent and the effectiveness of representation
is explained in two ways. First, there is a feeling that the PC is management-
dominated in terms of agenda setting, and ordinary PC representatives’ views on
contentious issues are not taken seriously. Second, it is clear that the PC has been a
useful forum for agreeing integrative concerns through consultation (which helps
explain why a clear majority agreed that the PC was effective) but, as we explore
later, the PC is considered as an ineffective forum for agreeing distributive issues
through negotiation.
On the first point, we tested employees’ evaluation of how good managers are at
employee communications and involvement. The results are presented in Table 2.
Employees were evenly divided in regard to their evaluation of how good their
TABLE 1 Employee voice mechanism and process in FinanceCo
Issue Mechanism Process
Working arrangements Team working, team
briefing
Individual, direct
Redundancy PC briefing Collective, Information/
consultation (formal)
Business plan Team briefing, e-mail,
intranet, breakfast
meetings
PC
Individual and direct,
Consultative (weak)
Car parking, office
relocation
PC Consultative (strong)/
negotiative
Pay PC Information
Grievance, discipline Codified, line
management and/or
PC
Choice of individual or
collective approach
PC = Partners’ Council.
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managers were at involving them in decision making, with 43 per cent indicating a
positive result and 46 per cent indicating a negative one. Some managers indicated
that neither staff nor PCs should be involved in decision making. Rather, staff should
be kept informed of decisions and of the way in which those decisions may have an
impact on their jobs:
The Partners’ Council representative’s role is again support, ensuring
people are communicated with in the right way, that we’ve followed, as
a management team, due process.
The survey results also indicate that women (37 per cent) had a lower opinion of
managers in this respect, with the majority of men (54 per cent) believing otherwise.
TABLE 2 Employees’ evaluation of how good managers are at employee communications and
involvement, by occupational group, n = 128
Occupational group Very
good (%)
Good
(%)
Poor
(%)
Very
poor (%)
Undecided
(%)
Involving employees in decision making
All respondents 5 38 40 6 11
Manager 0 46 50 0 4
Professional specialist 0 35 41 3 21
Technical 0 40 30 10 20
Administrators,
clerical, secretarial
and others
10 35 37 8 10
Keeping everyone up-to-date about proposed changes at work
All respondents 9 49 30 6 6
Manager 0 54 29 8 9
Professional specialist 7 62 21 7 3
Technical 10 40 40 0 10
Administrators,
clerical, secretarial
and others
13 42 34 6 5
Providing everyone with the chance to comment on proposed changes
All respondents 6 52 28 7 7
Manager 0 58 33 4 5
Professional specialist 0 69 14 10 7
Technical 20 60 0 0 20
Administrators,
clerical, secretarial
and others
10 40 37 8 5
Responding to suggestions from employees
All respondents 3 39 37 11 10
Manager 4 46 29 13 8
Professional specialist 0 41 35 10 14
Technical 10 40 20 10 20
Administrators,
clerical, secretarial
and others
3 34 44 12 7
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Fifty-four per cent of managers (who comprised 19 per cent of the total sample) in
our sample were women and 73 per cent of the lower-grade administrative staff
(49 per cent of sample) were women. The lower score given by women may be
explained by a concentration in lower grades. However, it is worth recording that in
interviews, a number of women managers referred to the ‘boys’ club’ nature of the
organisation whereby women had difficulties in rising to the top jobs because of
male networking (Upchurch et al., 2003). The performance of management in keeping
people up-to-date about proposed changes at work was regarded by the majority of
employees as good or very good, with the professional and specialist staff returning
the highest rating (69 per cent). Most areas thought that they were well informed in
terms of operational issues but less so in regard to the wider picture. Changes have
been conveyed to staff in a structured way, much of it on the Intranet or via email
and team briefings. However, some staff commented on the quality of information.
For example, one PC representative was critical of the efficacy of management
communication on the then (2002) recently announced restructuring programme:
The information that was given isn’t complete, the staff do not know
whose departments they are going to be working in, they do not know
who they work for, they don’t know if they’re going to have new terms
and conditions of employment.
Overall, these results are a little different from those reported for all workplaces
by WERS (Kersley et al., 2005). However, in this example of NER, rather than putting
an effective mechanism in place to encourage comment and reinforce a high-
commitment practice, there was too great a reliance on managers’ individual
commitment to achieve this end. One PC representative argued that it was a question
of leadership and the structure of staff meetings. Communication events such as
breakfast meetings, when staff were likely to be on their best behaviour, were not
conducive to airing controversial points of view. Her view was that ‘enlightened HR
practice’ was preferable to dependence on ‘enlightened’ managers, with the implicit
criticism that such enlightened practices were generally absent.
More importantly, managers’ record of responding to employees’ suggestions was
considered by almost half of the staff as poor or very poor. Administrative, clerical
and secretarial staff rated managers particularly poorly in this respect (56 per cent).
Managers’ rating of their own bosses barely reached a 50-per cent positive score.
According to one PC representative, HR was aware of this problem: ‘All the things
that we said with the last restructuring . . . it’s just been completely ignored, and I
know HR said the same thing’. Others have commented that if managers are pushed
hard enough then feedback is forthcoming even though ‘you have to wait a while’.
And one ex-PC representative reported that the company did respond well, citing
feedback to comments on plans for a new building:
We were shown the plans, the ground plans and they said ‘have a look
at them’. Actually this was when I was on the Partners’ Council. So it
was given to the Partners’ Council to look at but we did make a lot of
suggestions and we said ‘this isn’t going to work’, and they did change
it which was good.
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Responses from some PC representatives such as the one previously quoted and
managers suggest that a meaningful exchange of information does feature between
some PCs and management, particularly with regard to integrative issues. But as the
results in Table 2 indicate, many employees are either unaware of this exchange or
feel detached from the process. This is despite the high awareness of the PC and the
high recognition of PC representatives by employees.
When substantive and distributive issues are examined, the weakness of the PC
as an agent of employee voice is exposed. The degree to which participative rights
were given to employees is a strategic question for the management. Releasing more
power to the PC was a sensitive issue within the managerial hierarchy, reflecting
both division of opinion and concern over the degree to which the PC should be
maintained as an informative/consultative rather than a negotiative body. One
manager who was clearly uncomfortable about the extent to which employees
should have an influence was concerned about ‘economy with the truth’ coming out
of PC minutes. He thought that at least one PC representative had ‘their own agenda’
and remarked that he disliked the term ‘employee rights’ because of its connotations;
‘sounds a bit too unionised’. Another manager commented:
I think people believe consultation is about collaboration in terms of
what you can actually redesign. . . . People enter into consultation
believing they can put things back to where they started and that’s
unfortunately not the way it is. So people have a cynical view on
consultation in that actually ‘you’re just consulting us because you have
to consult with us’.
Table 3 records employees’ responses to how often they felt they were asked their
views on a range of concerns of a substantive nature. It would be expected that if
the partnership approach was an active process of employee involvement then there
would be positive feelings from employees that they are listened to and that
managers actively solicit views. However, as Table 3 shows, there were strong
negative rather than positive feelings expressed about managers’ willingness to take
note of employee concerns, especially when it came to substantive issues such as pay.
In regard to seeking employees’ views on staffing including redundancy, a high
proportion of staff apart from managers reported that they were hardly ever or never
approached for their views. The picture in regard to changes to working practices
was seemingly quite positive. A majority (66 per cent) specified that managers,
sometimes or frequently, asked for their views. Administrators, clerical and
secretarial staff, however, were evenly divided over this issue. The interview data
suggest that the situation concerning consultation over changes to working practices
is complex. One response reveals again that there is a distinction between how
managers and employees interpret consultation:
There’s a restructure happening and we have no involvement in what
the new jobs look like. . . . You can discuss it, but they won’t consult
us. . . . I think that’s quite annoying because your future is being shaped
in the room and you’re not even allowed say what you think, what it
should look like or what this job really is and you’re the person who
does it but you’ve got a manager who is making all these decisions.
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This suggests that employees feel marginalised when it comes to reformulating or
redesigning jobs. But no doubt managers feel that they are always happy to discuss
the issues and, where viable, implement changes to working practices suggested by
employees. The different positions held by managers and employees in regard to the
scale and scope of employee involvement was a manifestation of the conflicting
perceptions of the meaning involved in words such as consultation and discussion,
which we suggest is a process dilemma of the partnership framework.
FinanceCo perceive pay as subject to discussion between the individual and the
appropriate manager. Only a quarter of the respondents indicated that they were
frequently or sometimes asked for their views on pay. Managers were the most likely
group to be consulted, but among them, two-thirds indicated that they were hardly
ever or never approached on pay issues. It is clear from the interview data that pay
was considered as a source of grievance and dissatisfaction. Pay is a complex issue
in the organisation, with individual performance targets linked to broad banding
developed from the Hay job evaluation and then overlaid with business division
and occupational bonuses associated with Sharing in Success. This complexity is
likely to have two by-products. First is a potential lack of transparency within the
TABLE 3 Employees’ response to how often managers ask for their views on different
employment issues, by occupational group, n = 128
Occupational group Frequently
(%)
Sometimes
(%)
Hardly
ever (%)
Never
(%)
Staffing issues, including redundancy
All respondents 7 24 38 31
Manager 12 46 17 25
Professional specialist 4 24 55 17
Technical 10 20 10 60
Administrators,
clerical, secretarial
and others
6 16 42 36
Changes to work practices
All respondents 14 52 24 10
Manager 25 50 17 8
Professional specialist 7 76 14 3
Technical 10 80 0 0
Administrators,
clerical, secretarial
and others
14 37 36 13
Pay issues
All respondents 6 19 48 27
Manager 17 16 42 25
Professional specialist 0 24 48 28
Technical 0 20 50 30
Administrators,
clerical, secretarial
and others
5 16 51 28
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organisation as the peer knowledge of others’ pay is obscured. The second natural
comparator made by individuals is the relationship of their own pay with that
perceived for equivalent jobs outside. Within this mix of comparisons, the individual
will develop a sense of fairness or unfairness, which can sometimes be contradictory
in its motivational effects. Sharing in Success proved to be the most contentious source
of complaint, and the sense of grievance over the unfair distribution came at a series
of presentations by senior management to the PC. The average management bonus
was in double figures while staff bonuses varied from nothing to a single figure
amount. The management reasoning for the inequity was based on the stated
premise that the management ‘bore all the risk’ in the organisation. After the
presentation was made, there was uproar within the PC, with reports from
representatives that if ‘a union had been standing outside the gates now they would
get busloads of members’. While PC representatives were given the opportunity to
complain about the unequal distribution of the bonus, there was no provision for
negotiation or review. The PC was effectively used by management to release
information, with the secondary aim of allowing the PC representatives to ‘let off
steam’ but at the same time offer some legitimation to the process of consultation
and, by implication, to uphold management prerogative.
WHY THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE VOICE?
The preceding section leads us to believe that in this case study, the mix of NER and
partnership had proved relatively ineffective for employee voice. But was this a
result of partnership, non-union representation, or both? To probe further, we tested
employees’ views on how their voice might be better considered. Did the PC need
more independence from management, or would they consider trade union
representation, for example, to be a more effective conduit? Our survey also asked
staff whether or not the PC was good at communicating with members and took
notice of members’ complaints. On these latter questions, there was a very positive
response with 80 and 86 per cent responding positively for each question,
respectively. When asked if the PC was taken seriously by management and if the
PC made a difference to working life in the organisation, positive responses fell to
48 and 36 per cent, respectively. The drop in response rate would indicate problems
of effectiveness of the PC but does not tell us if a trade union would be any more
effective. Table 4 provides more illuminating evidence on the reasons for the
dissatisfaction with the PC’s effectiveness.
What should be noted about the results is that there was no question about trade
unions and representation in terms of pay. This question was not asked at the
insistence of FinanceCo for the reason that pay is non-negotiable within the
organisation apart from on individual appeal. For the same reason, only 10 per cent
of respondents would use the PC to gain a pay increase, preferring mostly to go
direct to their line manager. A different picture emerges in respect to representation
concerning grievance and discipline. Respondents were divided over whether they
preferred to represent themselves, opt for PC, or trade union representation, with
highest numbers preferring self-representation. This reflects a polarisation between
collectivist and individualist approaches to personal survival and progress within
the organisation. Some gender differences were apparent. In regard to work-related
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grievance (36 per cent) and discipline (29 per cent), women were less likely to favour
self-representation than men (56 and 57 per cent). According to one PC
representative:
The constituents have got this feeling which I’ve got to try and get out
of their systems, that if they raise issues then it might become a black
mark for them with the line managers, or if the problem is going to go
to a committee meeting and talk about an issue that I’ve raised, ‘will he
discuss my name’?
The management domination of the PC as representatives posed problems for the
effectiveness of the PC in representing lower-grade staff. Employees who raise
grievances or seek representation over disciplinary matters will often find other
managers representing them. One respondent noted that ‘I don’t know anybody that
TABLE 4 Partners’ Council and representation by occupation, n = 128
Occupational group Myself (%) PC (%) Line manager (%) Undecided (%)
Who do you think would best represent you if you want to gain a pay increase?
All respondents 33 10 49 8
Manager 33 17 42 8
Professional specialist 38 10 42 10
Technical 40 10 50 0
Administrators,
clerical, secretarial
and others
29 7 56 8
Myself PC Trade union Undecided
Who do you think would best represent you if you have a work-related grievance?
All respondents 43 29 14 14
Manager 38 29 8 25
Professional specialist 48 21 21 10
Technical 50 40 0 10
Administrators,
clerical, secretarial
and others
41 31 15 13
Who do you think would best represent you if a manager wanted to discipline you?
All respondents 38 29 15 18
Manager 27 36 14 23
Professional specialist 43 21 21 15
Technical 44 44 0 12
Administrators,
clerical, secretarial
and others
38 29 15 18
PC = Partners’ Council
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isn’t management that is in it [PC] really’. Thus, employees face a second dilemma.
Can PC representatives who are also managers fully represent employee interests?
Will managers’ allegiance to the organisation mar their PC representative role?
In fact, the management dominance of the PC came through in a number of ways.
First, senior HR management had control over who was ‘allowed’ to stand for
election to the full-time chair of the PC; second, senior management controlled the
taking and publication of minutes; third, the emphasis of the PC was on information
giving and minimal consultation rather than on negotiation; and finally, management
staff dominated the representative structure of the PC. In addition, evidence from
interviews would seem to confirm that such an approach was part of a conscious
management strategy to neutralise the PC as an effective vehicle of employee voice.
Rather, the PC was seen as a transmission belt of the management message, and
representatives were expected to be lubricators of the management imperative. A
mortgage specialist was particularly blunt about what she thought of the PC –
‘bloody waste of time’! – on further probing, she added:
Because it’s [PC] not independent, because it is run by their own
management, people won’t really say ‘this isn’t fair’ or ‘this isn’t right’.
Nobody’s got the guts to say because it’s in-house.
In reality, the strategic role of the PC was more nuanced, and some managers
expressed their views of the role of the PC in a more complex fashion. These
managers implied that PCs should be integrated into the business and used as a
mechanism to legitimise the decision-making process and the direction of company
policy by bringing employees or at least their PC representatives onside. This was
often expressed in terms of having PC representatives that have a ‘balanced view
and opinion’; as one manager said: ‘On the basis I believe I’ve got someone there
who you know is balanced I think [PCs] can work very well’. Paradoxically, the
message coming from the executive level of the organisation is for employees to have
a greater say in the organisation even to the extent of consulting ‘about the pay
and pay rounds’, but not negotiation. ‘But at the moment you don’t even get
consultation’. A comment on this subject from another manager suggests that the
important contribution PCs can make is to create a more pluralist environment to
reconcile any areas of conflicting interests: ‘The senior management need someone to
push against, as opposed to actually having it all their own way’.
Such views and opinions from management and staff support the view that
partnership in FinanceCo was in essence a process whereby management imperative
sought legitimation through a consensus-based framework. Concerns about lack of
effectiveness focused primarily on the substantive issue of pay where employees
perceived that union representation might outperform NER.
DISCUSSION: THE ‘PARADOX OF INTENTION’
We have sought in this article to explore the effectiveness of non-union employee
representation in progressing employee voice in an explicit ‘partnership’
organisation. From an employers’ perspective, partnership has two major objectives.
First is to harness employee creativity through commitment and motivation
engendered by techniques of employee involvement and participation. This is the
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stated objective of government organisations such as the Involvement and
Participation Association, CBI and CIPD, as well as the British TUC. It provides the
rationale for the benefits of the high-performance workplace and the ‘win-win’
scenario whereby organisational productivity improves and employees experience
an enhanced job satisfaction and security in return. Associated with such a
partnership approach is the desire for transparency of information, a mutual respect
for different interests and a focus on improving the quality of working life. A second
reason for partnership for the employer is the desire to provide a micro-institutional
avenue for employee voice and dissent that does not threaten managements’
prerogative on the introduction of change and which acts as an alternative to
potentially threatening adversarial or conflictual models. Ackers (2002) attempts to
define this approach as a neo-pluralist one as a replacement for traditional but
outdated pluralist adversarialism in a new age of risk and uncertainty. Critics,
however, argue that such a partnership approach, when used as an employee
relations strategy, is reminiscent of the collaborationist ‘business unionism’, which
emerged in the UK in the 1980s (Kelly, 1996; McIlroy, 1998). In the context of
FinanceCo, the fact that non-union employee representation was constructed to
express a collective employee voice also raised the question of whether or not the
employer was consciously adopting a union substitution strategy. In addition, we
argue that our case study is of contemporary importance both because of the implicit
commitment of the government to a ‘multi-channel’ model of industrial relations in
Britain and because of the Information and Consultation Regulations.
Our study finds that there were limits to the amount of involvement and influence
in the organisation flowing from a contradictory position of management compared
to non-management grades. Although much information was provided by managers
on workplace change, there was a marked unwillingness of managers to act on
employees’ concerns at the effects of these changes. Employee voice, expressed as the
ability of employees to persuade and invoke change, was subsequently constrained.
In this respect, employee involvement was prioritised by management in its negative
rather than positive sense and was used, as Ramsay (1996) has suggested in other
cases, to shape employees’ attitudes so that employees are more likely to accept
change as the imposition of management will rather than through their own
independent will. Neither has partnership been used to develop a real and equal
dialogue about key aspects of the business. The PC had been constructed by
management as the formal expression of non-union workplace partnership, but in
reality, the PC is an ineffective agent of collective employee voice because of its
dependent nature, its management dominance and its inability to move beyond the
most basic consultative mechanisms. The evidence here would support Freeman and
Medoff’s (1984: 108) original contention that an effective worker voice requires that
‘. . . management give up power and accept a dual authority channel . . . (but) if
management gives up power it creates the genuine seeds of unions; if it doesn’t,
employee representation plans may be mere window dressing’. To a certain extent,
the unwillingness to release power may be historically determined by the employee
relations tradition in the building society industry whereby non-unionism has been
de rigueur. It may also be a product of the rule- and procedure-bound environment
in financial institutions where bad decisions can cost money and where the industry
is subject to the scrutiny of external regulation. Despite these caveats, it remains the
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case that management has a strategic choice over its employee relations regime, and
the choice made by management has severely constrained the options for real
employee involvement and participatory working. We detected some discomfort
within management over such a choice. Ironically, partnership is presented as a
progressive way forward for employees in the organisation with an enhanced
democracy within the workplace. But instead, the actuality of the partnership
strategy both confirms and consolidates existing power discrepancies and presents
only a façade of economic democracy in the process. Rather than developing mutual
gains, partnership in our case study acts instead as a conduit for employer agendas
(cf. Heckscher, 1996). As such, this case study of NER-based partnership suffers from
our ‘paradox of intention’ and becomes the reverse mirror of its own ambitions,
reflecting the very opposite of its claimed intent.
To meet the terms of ‘independence’ specified in the Information and Consultation
of Employees Regulations 2004, it is likely that some of the less democratic practices
(such as elections for lead positions) highlighted in FinanceCo could be challenged.
However, even with the Regulations, the weak consultative nature of the PC would
remain. We would argue that both the mechanism and process of employee voice in such
forms of NER are embedded, and it is from this embeddedness that the paradox of
intention arises. Given the drift towards non-union forms of employee representation
in the UK, such a conclusion has a significance for policy and practice and suggests
that further efforts at institutional enforcement of employee voice will be required if
the goal of high performance is to be achieved.
Notes
1. Measured on five items, workplaces with 25 or more employees.
2. ESRC Award Number L212252096.
3. www.statistics.gov.uk
4. Labour Force Survey. There are considerable variations in regional trade union
density in the sector, with a density of 57.7 per cent in the North-East of England
(highest) compared with the 15.2 per cent in London (lowest). The South-West,
where most of the case study employees are located, recorded a density of
31.0 per cent (Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 2003).
REFERENCES
Ackers, P. (2002). ‘Reframing employment relations: the case for neo-pluralism’. Industrial
Relations Journal, 33: 1, 2–19.
Ackers, P., Marchington, M., Wilkinson, A. and Dundon, T. (2005). ‘Partnership and voice,
with or without trade unions: changing UK management approaches to organizational
participation’, in M. Martinez Lucio and M. Stuart (eds), Partnership and Modernisation
in Employment Relations, London: Palgrave, pp. 23–45.
Bryson, A. (2000). Have British Workers Lost Their Voice, or Have They Gained a New One?,
PSI Research Discussion Paper 2, London: Policy Studies Institute.
Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) (2001). Management Choice and
Employee Voice, London: CIPD.
Cressey, P. and Scott, P. (1992). ‘Employment technology and industrial relations in
clearing banks – is the honeymoon over?’. New Technology, Work and Employment, 7: 2,
83–94.
Employee representation and partnership in non-union sector
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, VOL 16 NO 4, 2006408
© 2006 The Authors.
Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Danford, A., Richardson, M. and Upchurch, M. (2003). New Unions, New Workplaces: a
Study of Union Resilience in the Restructured Workplace, London: Routledge.
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2002). High Performance Workplaces – the Role of
Employee Involvement in a Modern Economy, London: DTI.
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2003). Trade Union Membership, Office for
National Statistics, London: DTI.
Dietz, G., Cullen, J. and Coad, A. (2005). ‘Can there be non-union forms of workplace
partnership?’. Employee Relations, 27: 3, 289–306.
Dundon, T. and Rollinson, D. (2004). Employment Relations in Non-union Firms, London:
Routledge.
Freeman, R. and Medoff, J. (1984). What Do Unions Do?, New York: Basic Books.
Gall, G. (1999). ‘Union resilience in a cold climate: the case of the UK banking industry’,
in M. Upchurch (ed.), The State and Globalisation: Comparative Studies of Labour and
Capital in National Economies, London: Mansell.
Gall, G. (2000). ‘From adversarialism to partnership? Trade unionism and industrial
relations in the banking sector in the UK’. Employee Relations, 23: 4, 353–375.
Gollan, P. (2000). ‘Non-union forms of employee representation in the United Kingdom
and Australia’, in B.E. Kaufman and D.G. Taras (eds), Non-union Employee
Representation: History, Contemporary Practice, and Policy, New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp.
410–449.
Gollan, P. (2005). ‘Silent voices: representation at the Eurotunnel call centre’. Employee
Relations, 34: 4, 423–450.
Gospel, H. and Willman, P. (2003). ‘Dilemmas in worker representation’, in H. Gospel and
S. Wood (eds), Representing Workers, London: Routledge, pp. 144–165.
Greenfield, P. and Pleasure, R. (1993). ‘Representatives of their own choosing: finding
workers’ voice in the legitimacy and power of the unions’, in B. Kaufman and M.
Kleiner (eds), Employee Representation: Alternatives and Future Direction, Madison, WI:
Industrial Relations Research Association.
Guest, D. and Hoque, K. (1994). ‘The good, the bad, and the ugly: employment relations
in new non-union workplaces’. Human Resource Management Journal, 5: 1, 1–14.
Hasluck, C. (1999). Employment Prospects and Skill Needs in the Banking, Finance and
Insurance Sector, DfEE Skills Task Force, Research Group, Paper 9.
Heckscher, C. (1996). The New Unionism: Employee Involvement in the Changing Corporation,
Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
Hirschman, A.O. (1970). Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations,
and States, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hyman, R. (2005). ‘Whose (social) partnership’, in M. Stuart and M. Martinez Lucio (eds),
Partnership and Modernisation in Employment Relations, London: Palgrave, pp. 251–265.
Kelly, J. (1996). ‘Union militancy and social partnership’, in P. Ackers, C. Smith and P.
Smith (eds), The New Workplace and Trade Unionism, London: Routledge, pp. 77–109.
Kersley, B., Alpin, C., Forth, J., Bryson, A., Bewley, H., Dix, G. and Oxenbridge, S. (2005).
Inside the Workplace: First Findings from the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey
(WERS 2004), London: DTI.
Kochan, T., Katz, H. and McKersie, R. (1986). The Transformation of American Industrial
Relations, New York: Basic Books.
Kristensen, J.E. (2001). ‘Corporate social responsibility and new forms of social
partnerships’, in C. Kjægaard and S.-Å. Westphalen (eds), From Collective Bargaining to
Social Partnerships: New Roles for the Social Partners in Europe, Copenhagen: The
Copenhagen Centre, pp. 21–38.
Lloyd, C. (2001). ‘What do employee councils do? The impact of non-union forms of
representation on trade union organisation’. Industrial Relations Journal, 32: 4, 313–327.
Martin Upchurch, Mike Richardson, Stephanie Tailby, Andy Danford and Paul Stewart
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, VOL 16 NO 4, 2006 409
© 2006 The Authors.
Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Marchington, M. (1994). ‘The dynamics of joint consultation’, in K. Sisson (ed.), Personnel
Management, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 662–693.
Martin, R. (2003). ‘Politics and industrial relations’, in P. Ackers and A. Wilkinson (eds),
Understanding Work and Employment: Industrial Relations in Transition, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp. 161–175.
McIlroy, J. (1998). ‘The enduring alliance? Trade unions and the making of New Labour
1994–97’. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 36: 4, 537–564.
McLoughlin, I. and Gourlay, S. (1994). Enterprise without Unions: Industrial Relations in the
Non-union Firm, Buckingham: Open University Press.
Millward, N., Bryson, A. and Forth, J. (2000). All Change at Work? British Employment
Relations 1980–1998, as Portrayed by the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey Series,
London: Routledge.
Moran, M. (1991). The Politics of the Financial Services Revolution, London: Macmillan.
Nevin, E. and Davis, E. (1979). The London Clearing Banks, London: Elek Books.
Ramsay, H. (1996). ‘Involvement, empowerment and commitment’, in B. Towers (ed.), The
Handbook of Human Resource Management, Oxford: Blackwell.
Roy, D. (1980). ‘Repression and incorporation. Fear stuff, sweet stuff and evil stuff:
management’s defenses against unionization in the south’, in T. Nichols (ed.), Capital
and Labour: a Marxist Primer, Glasgow: Fontana.
Rubery, J. (1988). Employers and the Labour Market, Oxford: Blackwell.
Storey, J., Cressey, P., Morris, T. and Wilkinson, A. (1997). ‘Changing employment in UK
banking: case studies’. Personnel Review, 26: 1/2, 24–42.
Terry, M. (1999). ‘Systems of collective employee representation in non-union firms in the
UK’. Industrial Relations Journal, 30: 1, 16–30.
Terry, M. (2003). ‘Can “partnership” reverse the decline of British trade unions?’. Work,
Employment and Society, 17: 3, 459–472.
Upchurch, M., Tailby, S. and Richardson, M. (2003). ‘Patterns and prospects for
partnership at work’, unpublished report on ‘FinanceCo.’, Employment Studies
Research Unit, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England.
Watt, N. and Black, I. (2004). ‘We will not let EU weaken Thatcher union laws, says Straw’.
Guardian, 19 May.
Willman, P., Bryson, A. and Gomez, R. (2003). ‘Why do voice regimes differ?’, Centre for
Economic Performance Working Paper, London School of Economics.
Wills, J. (2000). ‘Great expectations: three years in the life of a European Works Council’.
European Journal of Industrial Relations, 6: 1, 85–107.
Employee representation and partnership in non-union sector
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, VOL 16 NO 4, 2006410
© 2006 The Authors.
Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
